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Chapters of Psychology
WILLEM J. M. LEVELT
13
An Interview with Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920)
Sehr geehrter Herr Professor Wundt, what is your opinion about the place o f 
psychology among the sciences o f  m ind? 1
As the science of the universal forms of direct experience, it is the foundation 
of the sciences of mind. Psychology is at the same time the most general science 
of mind and the foundation of all others, such as philology, history, economics, 
law, etc."
Are these special sciences o f  the mind, then, “chapters o f human psychology, ” 
ju st like, fo r  instance, developmental psychology or general psychology?
The psychological analysis of the most general products of mind, such as 
language, mythical representations, moral norms, is psychology’s due, in part as 
a necessary expansion of its territory over the phenomena of shared mental life, 
in part as an aid in grasping complex psychological phenomena at all.*
But is it realistic to expect that anthropologists (whom you call "Volkerpsycholo- 
gen"), linguists, or historians who study these products o f mental life will ever 
consider themselves psychologists?
It could appear that psychology, too, would be best served if the one who 
ventures to address the anthropological issues combines the qualifications of the 
historian and the philologist with those of the psychologist. But for two reasons I 
believe that there is little prospect, at least for the time being, that this wish will 
be fulfilled. First, given the current partitioning of scientific research, one can 
hardly expect the philologist or historian to approach the issues in a way that 
would satisfy the present standards of scientific psychology. Second, maybe one 
should not even blame him for this, because his task and the perspectives with 
which he necessarily approaches the issues are essentially different/ However, 
anthropology as such will remain part of psychology/
You are called the fa ther o f  experimental psychology. Will these other “parts" o f 
psychology be experimental in nature?
Just like the natural sciences, psychology has two exact methods at its dis­
posal: The first one, the experimental method, serves the analysis of the simpler
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Figure 13.1. The author (left) interviewing Wundt (right).
psychological processes; the second one, the observation of the universal products 
of mind, serves the study of higher psychological processes and developments.8 
Where, then, do you see the boundaries o f the experimental method?
Its limits are reached only where specific mental phenomena and products arise 
from living in a human society; these are inaccessible to experimentation, such as 
is the case for language, mythology, and morals /  These mental products are the 
objects of observation.8
Finally, what is your conception o f the m ind-body relationship?
Such a relationship can be nothing else than two mutually connected causal 
chains, which, however, cannot affect easch other because of the incomparability 
of their parts. I have already called this the principle of psychophysical parallel­
ism.* So, for instance, the elements that figure in a spatial or temporal mental 
image will also entertain a regular relation of coexistence or succession in their 
physiological substrates.'
Thank you, Professor Wundt, fo r  these helpful comments.
From Wundt to Marr
Where are we now, almost a century later? In this section I will argue that, in 
spite of substantial progress in the study of mind, Wundt’s double distinction is
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by and large still valid. The first one concerns (simple) process versus (complex) 
product, the second one experiment versus observation; these distinctions are still 
ruling the relations between psychology and the other sciences of mind.
P rocess versus product: M a n ’s three levels o f  explanation
According to David Marr (1982), the “top level” of understanding any 
information-processing device is its abstract computational theory. This is a for­
mal characterization of the input-to-output mapping of the device. Or, in Wundt’s 
terms, it is a (formal) description of the system’s product. One example of such 
a theory is a visual grammar, a formal characterization of three-dimensional inter­
pretations for some domain of two-dimensional scenes. Another example is a gen­
erative grammar, a formal characterization of the well-formed sentences of a lan­
guage. As we saw, language is Wundt’s pet example of a complex psychological 
product. The goal of linguistics is to provide a computational theory of this prod­
uct of mind. In Wundt’s terms we are at this level dealing with anthropology, 
which is a proper part of psychology.
Marr’s second level is the algorithmic theory. It deals with how the computa­
tion is done, how an input representation is transformed into an output representa­
tion.2 There are myriad ways of generating a language’s well-formed sentences, 
and myriad ways of parsing two-dimensional stereo patterns into three- 
dimensional configurations of objects. The psychological aim here is, of course, to 
come up with an algorithm that faithfully models how we, human beings, generate 
sentences or parse stereoscopic scenes. The algorithmic theory is a process theory. 
This is the traditional domain of psychology, dating back to Wundt and earlier. 
Time and again, Wundt stresses that the primary psychological phenomena are 
events, processes ( “Vorgänge"), not objects.
Marr’s third level deals with the physical implementation of these processes. 
How is a mental process realized in the nervous system? Wundt was still largely 
in the dark about these implementational issues (though his ruminations about the 
substrate of spatial and temporal images are certainly consonant with the later 
discoveries of retinotopic mapping in the visual cortex and the recent work by 
Georgopoulos et al., 1989 on the time course of mental rotation in the motor 
cortex).
How does the product/process distinction relate to psychology’s place among 
the sciences of mind? My thesis is that, by and large, general psychology in the 
twentieth century has kept to its traditional role of studying processes, of seeking 
explanations at the algorithmic level. And it has been very good at that. But the 
corollary is that it has tended to ignore the universal products of mind; it has 
largely left computational theorizing to what I shall call the special sciences of 
mind, linguistics, logic, law, sociology, anthropology, and, as I shall argue be­
low, economics.
Psychology has not been in the forefront asking questions such as: What is a 
possible human language? What are possible systems of human spatial orientation? 
What are possible kinship systems? What are possible musical systems? What are 
possible conceptions of other people’s intentional states?” And so on. In short,
Chapters o f Psychology 187
psychologists have tended to ignore the issue of universals of human cognition, 
our genetic cognitive endowment.3
Instead, and in the best of cases, psychologists have accepted one or another 
existing cognitive system as a given and studied how it functions. And here, they 
have been quite successful. We now have sophisticated process theories of visual 
scene analysis, of word and sentence parsing, of the perception of rhythm and 
tonality, of inference making, and so forth.
In the worst of cases, though, psychologists have continued to stay away from 
the naturally given systems. In the tradition of Ebbinghaus (who was the first to 
study verbal memory experimentally, but by means of nonsense syllables), they 
have so much “purified” their experimental materials that the ecologically given 
system (of memory, of object recognition, of spatial attention, or what have you) 
is immunized. The resulting theories of processing are often mathematically so­
phisticated, but of questionable generalizability (i.e., ecological validity). To con­
clude this point, psychologists have been more than happy to accept Wilhelm 
Wundt’s experimental psychology, but they have been far less inspired by him as 
the father of Völkerpsychologie. Although products of mind are often the object 
of study in developmental psychology (e.g., What is the structure of children’s 
number system, their lexicon, or their conception of time?), they seldom are in 
Wundt’s core area, general psychology. By and large, general psychology (i.e., 
the study of general principles of mental life) has taken the complex products of 
mind for granted, leaving their analysis to the special sciences of mind, such as 
linguistics, anthropology, law, logic, sociology, musicology, and what have you. 
And there has never been much prospect indeed for Wundt’s wish in this respect 
to be fulfilled— that students of these products of mind are themselves sophisti­
cated in psychology. In other words, psychology has left some of its most precious 
gems to the care of other disciplines.
E xperim ent Versus Observation
Wundt’s position here was straightforward. Simple psychological processes should 
be studied by the experimental method. Complex mental processes, however, are 
inaccessible to experimentation and should, therefore, be approached indirectly— 
namely, by analyzing their products or outcomes. It is society that stabilizes such 
products (a language, a system of norms, etc.). They are inaccessible to experi­
mental study; observation is the only appropriate method here.
At this point, one should say that what Wundt established as the father of 
experimental psychology flourished substantially—better than he could have fore­
seen. Already in Wundt’s own time, there were remarkable efforts to study experi­
mentally higher-order processes such as reading, thinking, sentence comprehen­
sion; this in spite of Wundt’s castigations (Wundt, 1907, 1908). But it is 
especially since the so-called cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s that the 
experimental method became successfully applied to complex mental processes as 
well. One of the main forces here has been psycholinguistics. The experimental 
work by George Miller and his associates on syntactic processing in language 
comprehension still stands as a landmark of experimental innovation and creativ­
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ity. Now, thirty years later, we have at our disposal a wide gamut of experimental 
methods that trace processes of lexical access, syntactic parsing, and discourse 
interpretation “on line.” A very similar development is currently under way in the 
study of our skill of speaking (Levelt, 1989, 1993). For Wundt, the creation of 
sentences— one of the key issues in his psychology of language— was entirely in 
the domain of Völkerpsychologie—that is, inaccessible to experimentation.
Not only has the experimental method conquered the domain of complex men­
tal processing, it also came to be used in the study of outcomes or products of 
complex processing. We now ask our subjects to judge the well-formedness of 
sentences; we ask them which bet they prefer, or which of two visual patterns 
they find more pleasing.
Although these developments have shown Wundt’s assignment of methods to 
be untenable, it still governs the relations between psychology and its neighboring 
sciences of mind. Psychology is the only science of mind where the dominant 
methodology is experimental. One does see an occasional experiment in anthro­
pology and a few more in economics, but that is about it. The major method for 
the other sciences is systematic observation: questionnaires, statistics, participant 
observation, introspection, diary studies, or whatever the local art may be. After 
almost a century, Wundt’s assignment of research methodologies to disciplines 
(whether or not “parts of psychology”) is still in force. Although there can be 
good reasons to opt for one methodology over another (for instance, it would be 
plainly impossible to approach historical issues by means of experiment), these 
methodological predilections often lack intrinsic motivation. It is, in fact, remark­
able to what extent psychology and experimental psychology have become associ­
ated in twentieth-century psychology— often to the degree of near synonymy. It is 
somewhat like defining history as the science of archive searching.
Linguistics and Microeconomics: Two Computational 
Chapters of Psychology
In this section I elaborate on the sketched relationship between psychology and 
the other sciences of mind in light of two examples— linguistics and microeco­
nomics. I argue that, in spite of their huge differences in subject matter, they 
entertain the same formal relationship to psychology. And that relationship is 
probably quite similar for other sciences of the mind.
Linguistics
Generative theories of grammar, Marr (1982) argued, are computational theories. 
They delineate the well-formed linguistic representations (syntactic, phonological, 
etc.) that the mind is capable of computing. Psycholinguistic theories, on the other 
hand, are algorithmic in nature. They deal with the mental processes that generate 
or parse the structural representations postulated in the computational theory.
Marr gave the advice to proceed from top to bottom in cognitive science. First 
produce a formal account of what the device is intended to compute, then start
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bothering about how it does the computing. The physical implementation will 
rarely, if ever, be a major constraint on the algorithmic theory, according to Marr 
(1982). Chomsky’s position has been similar:
There seems to be little reason to question the traditional view that investigation 
of performance will proceed only so far as understanding of underlying compe­
tence permits. (Chomsky. 1965, p. 10)
In other words, it makes little sense to create theories of human language parsing 
(theories of performance, algorithmic theories) without a solid understanding of 
the mental grammar in the language user (a theory of competence, a computa­
tional theory).
This is a rather ascetic position. Linguists are, not surprisingly, not too pressed 
to complete their chapter of psychology. And psycholinguists, I fear, don’t have 
the patience to wait for that glorious moment. Are they, then, meanwhile messing 
about in gloom? Not in my experience. Instead, the two enterprises are not en­
tirely independent. In fact, one of the attractions of Marr’s distinction between 
computational and algorithmic levels of explanation is that one has to bother about 
the correct assignment of an explanatory factor. Is it computational or algorithmic? 
Chomsky and Halle pointed out this problem a quarter of a century ago, in a less 
ascetic, more balanced mood:
It must, incidentally, be borne in mind that the specific competence-performance 
delimitation provided by a grammar represents a hypothesis that might prove to 
be in error when other factors that play a role in performance and the interrelation 
of these various factors come under investigation. . . . When a theory of perfor­
mance ultimately emerges, we may find that some of the facts we are attempting 
to explain do not really belong to grammar but instead fall under the theory of 
performance, and that certain facts that we neglect, believing them to be features 
of performance, should really have been incorporated in the system of grammati­
cal rules. (Chomsky & Halle, 1968, p. I l l )
This implies the possibility that algorithmic research may affect the computational 
theory. Hence, the two enterprises should go hand-in-hand, as has been Professor 
Wundt’s good advice all along.
Any computational theory involves an idealization, an abstraction from process 
and implementation. Chomsky’s rigorous idealization for linguistics goes like this:
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a com­
pletely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and 
is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, 
distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) 
in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance. (Chomsky, 
1965, p. 3)
During the almost three decades following this demarcation, we have learned to 
ask two questions. The first one is: Are the computational assumptions correct,—  
that is, are they psychologically valid? And the second one is: Are we making the 
psychologically correct assignments to the computational and the algorithmic lev­
els of explanation?
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Storms have raged over these issues. We have seen dramatic changes and 
diversification in grammatical theorizing. Some, such as Gazdar et al. (1985), 
continued Chomsky’s generative program— that is, to write grammars (of minimal 
generative capacity) that generate all and only the sentences of a natural language. 
These theorists maintain the psychological assumption that the generative rule- 
based grammar is a correct representation of the language user’s linguistic 
knowledge.
Others, including Chomsky himself, came to entirely dismiss the notion that a 
language can be formally generated: "Further formalization is pointless” (Chom­
sky, 1986, p. 91). The user’s linguistic knowledge is not a system of generative 
rules: "There are no rules at all, hence no necessity to learn rules” (Chomsky, 
1987, p. 68). Instead, according to Chomsky, our innate language capacity (or 
“universal grammar”) is a network of modules, each of which is based on princi­
ples that are invariant among languages. For instance, there are only a finite num­
ber of possible phrase structures within the syntactic module. They differ in terms 
of only a few parameters. Learning a language is setting those parameters. (Why 
this should make further formalization pointless is, however, less than obvious.)
The psychological validity of these, and many other computational proposals, 
is the subject of empirical research. Are Gazdar’s rules reflected in the way we 
parse sentences when we listen or read (Fodor, 1989)? Are young children really 
“setting parameters” when they acquire their native language (Weissenborn, Good- 
luck, & Roeper, 1992)? And so on. Each computational theory carries its own 
research agenda.
And with respect to the second question, what to assign to the computational 
and what to the algorithmic level (to “competence” or to “performance” in the 
linguistic jargon), the fights have been fierce as well. Initially (during the early 
1960s), the relation was considered to be quite transparent: Each (computational) 
rule of grammar would correspond to an (algorithmic) operation in perception or 
production. As a consequence, the more complex a sentence’s syntax, the harder 
it would be to process. But counterexamples soon emerged. A sentence like The 
horse raced past the barn fell, for instance, is much harder to parse than its simple 
syntax justifies. And this, Fodor et al. (1974) argued, is the result of our percep­
tual strategies or heuristics. When a sentence begins with a noun phrase followed 
by a verb, our first guess is that the noun phrase and verb relate as actor and 
action, and that is usually correct. But the heuristic doesn’t work for the example 
sentence (the horse was raced past the barn before it fell). This heuristics approach 
solved a range of enigmas in sentence processing. It also limited the role of the 
computational theory. The latter was merely there to characterize the well-formed 
output of parsing— that is, the ideal structural target of processing. But whether 
or how the target was reached became a problem sui generis. As a consequence, 
the algorithmic theory became much less dependent on the theory of syntax than 
it used to be. In fact, modem processing theories of language are compatible with 
almost any sophisticated grammar. The primacy of the computational theory over 
the algorithmic theory, as proclaimed by Chomsky and by Marr, has disappeared; 
the two enterprises are developing concurrently with surprisingly little interaction. 
Too little, to my taste. But the abandonment of primacy claims, one way or an­
other, is a major step ahead.
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Let us now move to an entirely different discipline, microeconomics, and no­
tice that it entertains the same formal relationship to psychology.
M icroeconom ics
Microeconomics deals, in part, with human decision-making—in particular, with 
the consumer’s choice behavior. That part of microeconomics is a theory of choos­
ing between means that are in short supply. And since most commodities in life 
(such as food, jobs, spouses, education, or fresh air) are in short supply, this part 
of microeconomics is ipso facto a quite general theory of human choice behavior. 
It should be noticed that other, and highly successful, parts of microeconomics 
don’t have individual choice behavior as their object. Operations research, for 
instance, deals with the efficiency of production or transportation processes, not 
with consumers’ choices. The following discussion, however, concerns only the 
aspect of microeconomics interested in consumer choices.
For Adam Smith (economics’ eighteenth-century founding father), economic 
theory should take the individual consumer’s behavior as its starting point. Ac­
cording to Smith, the behavior of aggregates derives in regular ways from individ­
ual choice behavior, variable as this may be. What would Wilhelm Wundt’s view 
be on this matter?
Professor Wundt, I  forgot to ask you this: How does an economical system 
emerge? Is economics also a chapter o f psychology?
Every attempt to understand economical history in causal terms leads to a 
psychological analysis. What else are supply-demand relationships, the spur of 
competition, and the other leverages of labor and trade than psychological mo­
tives?-'
Thank you, professor. I won’t intrude again.
This nicely parallels Wundt’s view on language. Language, according to 
Wundt, is in the final analysis a process in the individual speaker. But in an 
aggregate, a language becomes a more or less stabilized product.
As a theory of the individual consumer’s choice behavior, microeconomics is 
another chapter of human psychology. But it is a computational chapter. Modem 
microeconomic theories are typically axiomatic-deductive formal systems that gen­
erate sets of well-formed or “rational” choices. A rational choice is one that, given 
a limited set of resources, allocates these in such a way that the decision-maker’s 
own satisfaction is maximized. Although economic theories differ in important 
details with respect to their definition of rational choice, the rational choice para­
digm is at the basis of almost all present-day consumer theory.
The parallels to generative linguistics are ubiquitous. Both are deductive theo­
ries, involving similar idealizations. In economics one is dealing with an ideal 
decision-maker, just as generative linguistics postulates an ideal speaker-listener. 
An ideal decision maker is one who is fully informed about his or her own needs 
and preferences, and possesses all relevant information about the choice alterna­
tives and their utilities—just as the ideal speaker-listener “knows his language 
perfectly.” Moreover, the ideal decision maker is not subject to limitations of 
attention or memory; all relevant information is always available. This is, again, 
precisely the same idealization as was made in generative grammar. Finally, the
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market community is homogeneous; all consumers are alike in terms of informa­
tional state and subjective utility functions. This parallels the “completely homo­
geneous speech-community” of linguistics.
As a computational theory, microeconomics is a theory of rational outcomes 
or choices— of products of behavior. The rational choice parallels the well-formed 
sentence in linguistics. In neither case are we dealing with actual products of 
behavior, but with virtual or possible products. In that sense both kinds of theory 
are normative (see Massaro, 1991); they tell you what product is all right and 
what product is not.
And neither of the theories are process theories. The rational choice paradigm 
is as much ignorant of how a choice comes about, as is the generative grammar 
paradigm about how a sentence is produced.
Above we discussed two questions that were raised with respect to the demar­
cation between computational and algorithmic theories in linguistics. Exactly the 
same issues have been hotly debated in economics.
The first one was, Are the computational assumptions correct; are they psycho­
logically valid? In other words, are consumers rational agents? In economics, 
there has grown a kind of monstrous alliance to deny the validity of the assump­
tions. Arrow (1986), for instance, argues that the assumptions are incoherent. If 
all individuals are alike in utility function and information state (the homogeneity 
assumption), and rational decision implicates complete exploitation of informa­
tion, then there would be no trading at all. Trading results from economic agents 
being different in their state of knowledge or utility function.4
Others argue that the paradigm is well-nigh vacuous. Hogarth and Reder 
(1986) write:
However, to apply the rational choice paradigm, few— if any— psychological as­
sumptions are needed. The economic implications of the paradigm are compatible 
with virtually any account of the decision-making process so long as this gener­
ates appropriately sloped supply and demand curves.
And essentially the same is argued by Simon (1986), when he remarks that “neo­
classical economics becomes, as has been observed more than once, essentially 
tautological and irrefutable. ”
Tversky and Kahneman (1979, 1986), psychological intruders in the economic 
playground, take another tack. They turn to the axioms of expected utility the­
ory—that is, to the foundations of the rationality paradigm— and test their psycho­
logical validity by means o f experiments. The results are shocking; there is sub­
stantial and systematic violation of all axiomatic assumptions. This is like the 
systematic and substantial violations of linguists’ grammaticality predictions that 
Levelt (1972) found in an experiment where (other) trained linguists judged the 
well-formedness of sentences.
The second question was, Are we making the psychologically correct assign­
ments to the computational and the algorithmic levels of explanation? This issue 
has been actively pursued in economics with equal force. For decades, Herbert 
Simon has been in the forefront here. He is the preeminent algorithmic economist. 
According to him, the only thing of real interest is how people make their deci­
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sions. Decisions are made in a context of limited information about cost and sup­
ply functions, a particular framing of the choice situation, under severely limited 
attentional conditions, guided by particular beliefs and expectations. Within these 
limitations, the consumer will still have good reasons for each step in the process. 
In other words, economic agents have “procedural rationality.” But there is not 
the slightest hope that procedural rationality will have “substantive rationality” 
(i.e., computational rationality) as an emergent property. Says Simon (1986, p. 
39):
I would recommend that we stop debating whether a theory of substantive ratio­
nality and the assumptions of utility maximization provide a sufficient base for 
explaining and predicting economic behavior. The evidence is overwhelming that 
they do not.
Arrow (1986, p. 201) is as rabid in undermining the computational underpinnings 
of the rational choice paradigm. The rationality assumptions
certainly imply an ability at information processing and calculation that is far 
beyond the feasible and that cannot well be justified as the result of learning 
and adaptation.
This agrees with Simon’s position. The obvious untenability of the computational 
assumptions on which subjective utility theory is based led to various adapta­
tions that can be interpreted as “assignment shifts.” The computational theory 
started “importing” factors that had been previously assigned to the algorithmic 
level.
One example is the move to drop the assumption that the economic agent is 
fully informed. Information is among the scarcities that a decision maker has to 
cope with. In Search Theory (Stigler, 1961) the state of information is a variable, 
whose cost is a factor at the level of the computational theory. Smith (1985) 
similarly attaches a price tag to computational effort—that is, agent’s costs of 
thinking.
Another example of shifting boundaries between computational and algorith­
mic theory is provided by the Rational Expectations model (Lucas, 1981) in which 
agents behave fully rationally, given their state of information. But process factors 
may create systematic distortions in that informational state. For instance, manag­
ers systematically err in ascribing price movements to general versus industry- 
specific changes. In other words, agents are subject to illusions—which is an 
assignment to the algorithmic level. Tversky and Kahneman were among the first 
to stress the irrational force of such illusions.5
Whereas the latter two examples are still adaptations of the rational choice 
paradigm— essentially preserving the computational theory—Kahneman’s and 
Tversky’s Prospect Theory (1979) shifts most of the explanatory work to the algo­
rithmic level. Making a choice is a two-phase process. During the first phase the 
decision problem is “framed” in terms of potential acts, contingencies, and out­
comes. This framing process is subject to norms, habits, expectancies, and so on. 
During the second phase the prospects resulting from the first phase are evaluated, 
and the best one is selected.
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It is an empirical issue how framing and evaluation are achieved by the sub­
ject. According to the authors, the decision maker uses a set of powerful heuristics 
to arrive at a representation of the problem. These heuristics do not derive from 
the axioms of rational choice, but they are “procedurally rational” (Simon’s term) 
given the limited information on which the consumer has to act.
What is left, then, for a computational theory? Or in Marr’s terms: What is 
the agent trying to achieve? According to Prospect Theory it is, first, to avert 
losses and, second, something like living by the adage “a bird in the hand is worth 
two in the bush.” Consumers are certainly not maximizing expected utility. These 
aims are formally specified by means of an evaluation function, which is the 
computational part of Prospect Theory.
These developments in microeconomics are highly similar to those in linguis­
tics. The algorithmic theory has become largely independent of the computational 
theory. Heuristic procedures that are still reasonably effective under conditions 
of limited information and limited temporal resources replace foolproof rational 
procedures that require omniscience and unlimited computational resources. The 
computational theory has become more realistic; at the same time, it has ceased 
to dictate the structure of the algorithmic theory.
The present section exemplified psychology’s formal relationship to computa­
tional sciences of the mind by considering linguistics and economics in some more 
detail. In both cases, the situation evolved from one in which the computational 
theory dictated the structure of the algorithmic theory to one in which the algorith­
mic theory became independently motivated. Is there reason to expect that this 
more balanced relation will also extend to the implementational theory? I shall 
return to that question after a few remarks on the cultural relations among the 
sciences of mind.
Science Culture
The sciences of mind developed from a common core; many of them emancipated 
from philosophy no more than a few hundred years ago. The easy way of interpre­
ting the resulting partitioning is that it naturally follows the “joints of nature.” 
Linguistics deals with one faculty of mind, economics with another one, and so 
on. But this is obviously false. Which faculty of mind is the subject of anthropol­
ogy? Certainly, it must include the abilities to talk, to trade, to exercise moral 
judgment, etc. And how is anthropology different from sociology? In that it stud­
ies “non-Westem” people? Are there “Western” versus “non-Westem” faculties 
of mind?
Clearly, the present partitioning of the sciences is a rather arbitrary result of 
our cultural history. Capitalism grew economics, colonialism grew anthropology, 
and so on. And each science of mind cultivated its own local culture, its own pet 
topics, its own cherished methods.
But in spite of their ever growing divergence, the “computational” sciences of 
mind have still kept commonalities in scientific culture. These, however, are just 
as arbitrary as are their differences. I have already mentioned the tendency, canon­
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ized by Wundt, for these sciences to evade experimentation as a method. Econo­
mists do study “experimental markets” (see Smith, 1962, for a pioneering study), 
but this methodology is as marginal as the systematic experimental elicitation of 
sentences by linguists or the controlled field experiment in anthropology.
Another cultural commonality among the computational sciences of mind is to 
capitalize on intuitive judgment. The linguist’s or native speaker’s intuition that 
“this is a grammatical sentence” still counts as critical evidence in the evaluation 
of a theory of grammar. This in spite of obvious problems of measurement and 
interpretation (Levelt, 1974, Vol. 3). Similarly, the economist’s intuition that “this 
choice is rational” is still an important guide in constructing theories of choice, or 
at least in selling them: "To add credibility to the story, appeal is often made 
to everyday intuition concerning individual behavior" (Hogarth & Reder, 1986, 
p. 3).
Such examples can easily be multiplied. But the point can already be made: 
Neither the partitioning of the sciences of mind nor their differences and common­
alities of method are deeply principled in nature. Instead, we are all subject to an 
arbitrary legacy of history. But in the next section I argue that there is hope for 
the next century. The new generation of scientists of mind is increasingly dressed 
in blue jeans wearing the label “cognitive science.” That term is as ill-defined as 
the traditional ones, but it is at least nondivisive and nondogmatic.
Marr’s Three Levels According to Escher, Exemplified by the 
Theory of Speaking
Wilhelm Wundt was right: Psychology is the foundation of the sciences of mind. 
Its task is to disentangle how the mind and all of its faculties function. And Marr 
was right too: To study the mind’s operations, one must consider what it tries to 
achieve, what computational problem it tries to solve. Ever since Wundt’s time, 
the latter kind of question has been largely left to the “special” sciences of mind. 
And they have considerably grown apart, both among them and away from psy­
chology.
This has been to the detriment of both psychology and of the special sciences. 
The most remarkable effect on psychology has been the morbid growth of pro- 
cessitis, the tendency to study processes irrespective of their functions and of the 
representations that are relevant to those functions. Behaviorism, built on the ulti­
mate stimulus-response process, was killed by this disease (and its heir connec- 
tionism is a vulnerable next candidate). But processitis has been a lingering condi­
tion of psychology since the cognitive revolution. For instance, many 
psychologists still consider it to be an art to clean away from their experimental 
materials everything that could be of any ecological validity to the subject (the 
Ebbinghaus syndrome). The special sciences of mind likewise suffered by naively 
relying on outdated psychology (such as rational choice theory, behaviorism, or 
psychoanalytic theory).
But there can be well-founded hope that these seemingly irrevocable develop­
ments are coming to an end. As I have already indicated, the twentieth century is
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Figure 13.2. Marr’s three levels according to Escher. Copyright © 1953 by M .C . Escher/ 
Cordon Art— Baam— Holland.
closing its books with an ill-defined item called “cognitive science.” It is not a 
coherent science in terms of object, methodology, or education, but it certainly is 
a gigantic melting pot where disciplinary boundaries no longer hold. This is the 
right climate for growing irreverent offspring, for whom Marr’s three levels are 
like Escher’s litho Relativity, where climbing is decending and descending is 
climbing, without any preestablished priority or hierarchy among levels.
Let me exemplify this new state of affairs by referring to our most complex 
and species-specific skill, the ability to talk. Returning to his ascetic position, 
Chomsky (1988) argued that the scientific study of how we express our thoughts, 
the ordinary use of language in everyday life, is beyond reach, if not principally 
then at least factually for the time being. Why? Because there is no prospect of 
solving “Descartes’ problem”—namely, how it is possible that we can act in a 
free and undetermined way. Talking is free, undetermined action in that sense. 
Hence, there is no hope for a theory of speaking.
This is both logically and factually false. Logically, because even if we don’t 
know where thoughts to be expressed come from, we can study how, given such
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a thought, it becomes expressed in language (and why wouldn’t we be able to 
investigate where thoughts come from?). It is factually false, because since the 
1960s there has been substantial theoretical and empirical progress in the study of 
how we speak (for a review, see Levelt, 1989). This progress concerns both the 
issue of how speakers generate thoughts to be expressed, and the machinery of 
giving these thoughts syntactic, phonological, and articulatory shape. We have a 
clear case here where the (or, rather, one) computational perspective has been 
deeply misleading with respect to the feasibility of an algorithmic theory (let alone 
its physical implementation).
As a matter of fact, if anywhere, it has been in the study of language and 
speech production that Escher’s democratic relation between levels became a liv­
ing reality. Let us first consider the computational and algorithmic levels.
The speech-producing mechanism appears to have a highly modular organiza­
tion. Among the various component modules, there is one that controls grammati­
cal encoding— that is, the selection of appropriate words from the mental lexicon 
and the incremental production of syntactic structure. Another module controls 
phonological encoding— that is, it computes the phonological shape of the utter­
ance. For each module, its scientific analysis consisted of determining its charac­
teristic input and output representations (semantic, syntactic, phonological) and 
the operations that mediate between them.
For instance, the grammatical encoding module takes conceptual or semantic 
structures as input and generates syntactic surface structures as output. The phono­
logical encoding component takes surface structures as input and generates phono­
logical plans (both segmental and suprasegmental) as output. There is no way in 
which the computed representations are logically “prior to” the operations. There 
are quite restrictive operational requirements on the theory. For example, one 
central property of any psychologically sophisticated model of speech production 
is that production is “incremental”; both syntax and phonology are generated 
“from left to right” without much look-ahead. This, in turn, restricts the character 
of the input and output representations (semantic, syntactic, phonological) that can 
figure in such a theory. There is no primacy either for the computational theory 
(the theory of representations), or for the algorithmic theory (the process must run 
on relevant representations).
And what about Marr’s implementational level? Historically, the theory of 
speaking has been the neurologists’ playground since Broca discovered the 
speech-motor center in the left brain. The smarting shortage of interested psychol­
ogists gave the neurologists a free hand. And we should be grateful for what they 
accomplished. The careful delineation of aphasic syndromes, initially as a means 
to accomplish in vivo anatomical localization of cerebral disorders, led to the first 
functional models of language production. And these models were mostly modular 
in nature. Each module subserved a particular function in the process of speaking 
(such as activating word meanings or activating the articulatory shapes of words) 
and could ideally be localized on one of the lobes of the left hemisphere. This 
paradigm of negotiating between functional and cerebral modeling has fruitfully 
continued to the present day.
And equally active is the direct negotiation between cerebral modeling and
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representational or computational theory. A substantial part of present-day cogni­
tive neuropsychology is concerned with the types of representations that are acces­
sible or computable under different kinds of brain damage. Grodzinsky (1990, p. 
17) argues that these breakdown patterns are as criterial for a theory of grammar 
that is, the computational theory— as is its compatibility with an algorithmic or 
functional theory:
The internal structure of the theoretical account of a domain, then, effectively 
dictates which patterns of impairments are possible, and which are impossible.
An examination of deficit descriptions can be used to evaluate the theory. If the 
predictions it makes are correct, and if it is found to be compatible with break­
down patterns, we can conclude that it meets the neuropsychological constraint 
of breakdown-compatibility. This will be added to two other proposed constraints 
on the theory of grammer: those of learnability and parsability.
And the search for the brain’s modular specialization for different types of linguis­
tic representation continues at increased speed. The aphasiological evidence is 
being complemented by two further sources.
There is, first, the evidence stemming from single-cell recordings during open 
brain surgery. Creutzfeldt, Ojemann, and Lettich (1989), for instance, found neu­
rons in the left superior temporal gyrus that specifically responded to compound 
words such as horseshoe (as opposed to monomorphemic words, such as spa­
ghetti). Cellular and cell assembly models of linguistic units (such as phonological 
features, syllables, phrases, and clauses) are beginning to be developed (Braiten- 
berg & Pulvermiiller, 1992). Critical here is the realistic modeling of cortical 
circuits, such as is the case for the “canonical microcircuits” that Douglas and 
Martin (1990) proposed on the basis of their extensive anatomical and physiologi­
cal studies of brain tissue. The so-called “neural” networks of connectionism have 
very little to do with these real cortical circuits. Rather, the make-believe “neural” 
network modeling of connectionism is the latest excuse for behavioral scientists to 
stay away from issues of implementation, continuing the tradition of behaviorism.
There is, second, the explosive development of noninvasive (or almost nonin- 
vasive) brain imaging technology. The brain’s metabolic activity during the execu­
tion of linguistic tasks can now to some extent (and in different ways) be traced 
by positron emission tomography (PET) and through functional nuclear magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI). The first PET studies of speech production have re­
cently appeared (Peterson et al., 1988; Wise et al., 1991). They show that differ­
ent aspects of word retrieval (semantic, phonological/phonetic) in speech produc­
tion involve different areas of the brain, and thus are beginning to reveal the 
relations between representation and implementation at the brain’s macro scale.6 
Functional M RI is the greatest promise here. There is the expectation that its 
superb spatial resolution will soon be matched by a temporal resolution of one 
second or even less. The new imaging technologies will be material in redressing 
the still existing imbalance between computational and algorithmic theory, on the 
one hand, and implementational theory, on the other.
The successful dissection of our faculty of speech sets an example for the 
study of mind beyond the year 2000. Major leaps are to be expected if representa­
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tion, process, and implementation are studied in close interdisciplinary coopera­
tion. Any claims to priority among these three will be counterproductive. And 
don’t believe that Escher’s picture is an impossible one.
Notes
1. Wundt’s responses are free but faithful translations of the following German texts:
“ Als Wissenschaft von den allgemeingültigen Formen unmittelbarer Erfahrung , . . 
ist sie die Grundlage der Geisteswissenschaften . . . Psychologie . . . ist [sie] selbst 
die allgemeinste Geisteswissenschaft und zugleich die Grundlage aller einzelnen, wie 
der Philologie, Geschichte, Nationalökonomie, Rechtswissenschaft usw (Wundt, 1914, 
p. 18).
h daß . . . die psychologische Analyse der allgemeinsten geistigen Erzeugnisse, wie 
der Sprache, der mythologischen Vorstellungen, der Normen der Sitte, der Psychologie 
teils als eine notwendige Ausdehnung ihres Gebiets auf die Vorgänge des gemeinsamen 
seelischen Lebens, teils als ein Hilfsmittel für das Verständnis der verwickelteren psych­
ischen Vorgänge überhaupt zufällt, (Wundt, 1914, p. 10).
c Nun könnte es scheinen, als wenn auch der Psychologie dann am besten gedient 
wäre, wenn derjenige, der sich an die völkerpsychologischen Probleme heranwagt, die 
Eigenschaften des Philologen und des Historikers mit denen des Psychologen verbände. 
Aus zwei Gründen glaube ich jedoch, daß dieser Wunsch, vorläufig wenigstens, kaum Aus­
sicht hat, verwirklicht zu werden. Erstens wird man bei der gegenwärtigen Teilung der 
wissenschaftlichen Arbeit schwerlich erwarten dürfen, daß der Philologe oder Historiker 
die Sache in einer den heutigen Forderungen der psychologischen Wissenschaft genügen­
den Weise in Angriff nehmen werde; und vielleicht wird man ihm dies nicht einmal verden­
ken können, da die Aufgaben und, was damit unvermeidlich verbunden ist, die Gesichts­
punkte, mit denen er an die Probleme herantritt, wesentlich abweichend sind (Wundt 1904, 
p. v).
d Gleichwohl wird die Völkerpsychologie als solche ein Teil der Psychologie bleiben 
(Wundt, 1904, p.vi).
*■' Demnach verfügt die Psychologie, ähnlich der Naturwissenschaft, über zwei exakte 
Methoden: die erste, die experimentelle Methode, dient der Analyse der einfacheren psych­
ischen Vorgänge; die zweite, die Beobachtung der allgemeingültigen Geisteserzeugnisse, 
dient der Untersuchung der höheren psychischen Vorgänge und Entwicklungen (Wundt, 
1914, p. 30).
f Grenzen sind ihr erst da gesetzt, wo durch das Zusammenleben der Menschen geistige 
Vorgänge und Erzeugnisse eigener Art entstehen, die, wie die Sprache, die mythologischen 
Vorstellungen, die Sitten, der experimentellen Einwirkung unzugänglich sind (Wundt 1919, 
p. 11).
s . . . daß in diesem Fall geistige Erzeugnisse die Objekte der Beobachtung sind 
(Wundt, 1914, p. 29).
h Eine solche Beziehung kann nicht anders denn als ein Parallelgehen zweier mitein­
ander verbundener, aber vermöge der Unvergleichbarkeit ihrer Glieder niemals direkt 
ineinander eingreifender Kausalreihen angesehen werden. Ich habe dieses Prinzip . ■ . 
bereits als das des psychophysischen Parallelismus bezeichnet. (Wundt, 1919, p. 550).
‘ So werden z.B. die Elemente, die eine räumliche oder zeitliche Vorstellung konstitu­
ieren, auch in ihren physiologischen Substraten in einem regelmäßigen Verhältnis der 
Koexistenz oder Sukzession stehen (Wundt, 1914, p. 396).
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i . . .  daß jeder Versuch, die Erscheinungen der Wirtschaftsgeschichte ursächlich zu 
begreifen, auf eine psychologische Analyse hinausführt. Was sind in der Tat die Verhält­
nisse von Angebot und Nachfrage, der Sporn der Konkurrenz und die anderen Hebel des 
Arbeits—und Handelsverkehr anderes als psychologische Motive . . . ? (Wundt, 1908b, 
p. 397).
2. There is a potential source of confusion here. On the one hand, Marr calls the 
computational theory a representation. A grammar, for instance, is a representation of the 
language. On the other hand, he also calls the input and output of an algorithm a represen­
tation. I use “representation” only in this latter sense. However, this does not affect my use 
of Marr’s tripartition. The theory of representations— that is, their ultimate explanation— is 
the computational theory. The algorithmic theory takes representations for granted; it is 
explanatory only for the ways in which they are created or transformed.
3. Remarkable exceptions in the history of psychology are, among others, to be found 
in the Gestalt school of psychology, Heider’s social psychology, Piaget’s genetic psychol­
ogy, Michotte’s “Kantian” psychology, Gibson’s ecological psychology, and Rosch’s pro­
totype theory. All deal, in different ways, with outlining well-formed or “possible” prod­
ucts of mind.
4. The corresponding argument has never been made within the other chapter of psy­
chology, linguistics. If the linguistic community is completely homogeneous, all language 
users knowing their language perfectly and being without limitations in terms of their inter­
ests or states of attention, would there be any talking? At any rate, there will be no lan­
guage learning, because learning presupposes the existence of an incompletely informed 
state, for which there is no place in the idealization. There can be only a magical switch 
from the intitial state to the fully informed state.
5. Tversky and Kahneman’s theory of cognitive illusions, and more specifically their 
experimental approach to testing the rationality axioms, has not survived without criticism. 
See, for instance, Gigerenzer (1993).
6. We shall also have to live with dramatic overinterpretations. The beautifully col­
ored, symmetrical PET-scan images are becoming the Rorschach pictures of popular brain 
science: Every interpretation is accepted. The recent “Mind and Brain” issue of Scientific 
American, for instance, depicts verbs as being located in the prefrontal lobe and nouns in 
the temporal lobe of the left hemisphere, momentarily ignoring the speaker’s quite produc­
tive ability to use denominal verbs and deverbal nouns.
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